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Continental	Breakfast	9:	Can	Brexit	only	mean	exit?
European	foreign	policy	and	security	co-ordination
The	EU	has	recently	ramped	up	its	Common	Security	and	Defence	Policy.
Will	the	UK	be	able	to	maintain	similar	partnerships	with	the	EU	after
Brexit?	Sean	M	Deel	(LSE)	reports	on	an	LSE	Continental	Breakfast	discussion
at	Sciences	Po,	Paris	on	28	March	between	leading	thinkers	in	international
relations	and	European	politics,	with	contributions	from	policy	makers	and	civil
servants.
Continued	deep	ties	in	defence	and	security	have	clear	advantages	to	both
sides.	But	while	well-established	relationships	like	the	Anglo-French	alliance	may
be	easy	to	maintain	whatever	the	outcome	of	Brexit,	finding	a	place	for	the	UK	in
the	EU’s	more	ambitious	security	and	defence	integration	plans	may	depend	on
the	overall	tenor	and	outcome	of	the	negotiations	in	the	other,	more	politically
contentious,	domains	like	trade	and	the	Irish	border.	In	short,	it	seems	that	future
arrangements	in	foreign	policy	and	security	cooperation	are	subject	to	the	same
rule	governing	all	of	the	Brexit	negotiations:	nothing	is	agreed	until	everything	is	agreed.
What	the	UK	wants
Unlike	in	other	areas	of	the	negotiations,	the	UK’s	bargaining	hand	in	the	area	of	security	and	defence	is	quite
strong.	The	EU	has	good	reason	not	to	want	to	break	ties	with	a	permanent	member	of	the	UN	Security	Council	–	nor
to	lose	access	to	the	UK’s	considerable	defence	capabilities	and	expertise,	not	to	mention	its	contributions	to
European	defence	spending.	Furthermore,	in	contrast	to	other	areas	of	the	Article	50	talks,	the	UK	government	has
managed	to	clearly	outline	what	it	is	looking	for	from	a	future	UK-EU	security	relationship.
The	cockpit	of	a	Royal	Air	Force	A400M	Atlas	from	70	Sqn	based	at	RAF	Brize	Norton	taking
part	in	a	Flypast	over	Brussels,	Belgium,	to	mark	the	NATO	summit	on	25	May	2017.	Photo:
Defence	Images	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence
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In	last	year’s	Florence	speech,	Theresa	May	proposed	this	arrangement	take	the	form	of	a	treaty	between	the	UK
and	the	EU	that	could	provide	‘a	comprehensive	framework	for	future	security,	law	enforcement	and	criminal	justice
co-operation’.	The	goal	of	such	a	treaty	would	be	to	maintain,	as	closely	as	possible,	the	‘deep	and	special
partnership’	between	the	two	in	a	way	that	would	go	beyond	the	EU’s	agreements	with	other	external	partners.
Whether	the	future	relationship	ultimately	takes	the	form	of	a	treaty	or	some	other	combination	of	arrangements,	the
UK	government	has	signalled	its	willingness	to	continue	to	play	an	active	part	in	EU	defence	initiatives	and
institutions.	In	its	recent	white	paper	on	future	collaboration	in	foreign	policy	and	defence,	it	stressed	that	it	was
considering	ways	to	participate	in	the	Commission’s	European	Defence	Fund	and	to	collaborate	in	European
Defence	Agency	projects.	The	EU,	for	its	part,	has	not	shut	the	door	to	UK	participation	in	its	programmes,	though	at
this	stage	the	EU	has	largely	signalled	its	intention	to	treat	the	UK	as	a	‘third-country’,	rather	than	imagining	a	special
status	for	it	during	the	negotiations.
An	argument	can	be	made	that	defence	remains	largely	an	intergovernmental	domain	–	supported	by	agreements
between	governments	and	other	transnational	alliances	like	NATO	–	and	so	Brexit	need	not	cause	too	much	trouble
for	future	European	partnerships.	However,	it	is	also	true	that,	in	Europe,	this	intergovernmental	framework	is
increasingly	taking	place	under	the	auspices	of	the	EU.	For	this	reason	–	and	its	implications	for,	for	example,	the	UK
defence	industry	–	the	UK	is	keen	not	to	become	too	detached	from	EU	developments	after	Brexit.
Even	though	the	relationship	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	will	have	to	be	reconsidered,	there	is	the	potential	for
complementarities	to	emerge	from	a	new	arrangement.	Indeed,	there	are	some	signs	that	Brexit	may	resolve	some
of	the	dysfunctional	aspects	of	the	UK-EU	defence	relationship.	With	its	most	sceptical	partner	heading	for	the	door,
the	EU	has	managed	to	jumpstart	its	more	ambitious	defence	integration	plans,	which	had	been	languishing	for
years.	Likewise,	with	the	prospect	of	being	at	a	safe	distance	from	future	developments	within	the	bloc,	the	UK’s
attitude	towards	European	defence	collaboration	has	turned	markedly	less	dubious.	If	agreement	over	the	future
relationship	can	be	reached,	the	UK’s	new	role	as	an	ad-hoc	partner	may	suit	both	sides.
Since	the	referendum,	the	UK	has	abandoned	some	of	its	past	obstructionist	rhetoric	and	action.	Indeed,	in	recent
speeches	and	publications,	its	tone	has	been	remarkably	warm	and	enthusiastic,	and	these	changes	are	not	purely
rhetorical.	Under	David	Cameron’s	premiership,	for	example,	the	UK	government	had	resisted	setting	up	a	European
Defence	Fund	–	the	same	European	Defence	Fund	that	it	is	now	willing	to	make	contributions	to	even	after	it	leaves
the	EU.	Likewise,	in	a	vote	that	took	place	just	a	few	months	after	the	Brexit	vote,	the	UK	declined	to	veto	an
increase	in	the	European	Defence	Agency’s	budget,	the	first	such	increase	since	2010.	This	change	in	the	UK’s
stance	is	important	for	showing	its	goodwill	and	makes	it	more	likely	the	two	sides	will	not	fall	out.
European	defence	arrangements
Negotiations	so	far	have	made	it	clear	that	there	is	a	willingness	on	both	sides	for	a	post-Brexit	relationship	in
defence	and	security.	What	this	relationship	might	look	like	is	still	unclear.	Defence	and	foreign	policy	partnerships	in
Europe	are	characterised	by	a	number	of	different,	and	sometimes	overlapping,	coordination	mechanisms:
bilateralism,	mini-lateralism,	as	well	as	enhanced	cooperation	efforts	under	the	EU’s	Common	Security	and	Defence
Policy	(CSDP).	While	recent	trends	have	shown	a	clear	push	for	greater	integration	of	Member	State	competences,
the	EU	also	maintains	strong	relationships	with	external	allies,	including	Canada,	Norway,	and	the	US.
All	of	these	existing	mechanisms	and	relationships	provide	templates	for	the	forms	that	future	cooperation	between
the	UK	and	the	EU	might	take.	For	now,	however,	the	EU	seems	keen	to	engage	with	the	UK	in	a	way	that	conforms
to	its	general	rules	for	third-country	involvement.	In	other	words,	the	UK	cannot	be	treated	as	either	a	member	of	the
club	nor	as	a	privileged	external	partner,	though	this	does	not	rule	out	agreement	on	a	bespoke	arrangement	which
preserves	some	of	the	benefits	of	the	existing	alliance.	However,	EU	defence	policy	is	developing	quickly	without
British	involvement,	and	the	EU	is	seeking	to	‘protect	its	decision-making	autonomy	on	defence	operations	and
missions’.	This	makes	fitting	the	UK	into	future	arrangements	somewhat	more	complicated.
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Since	the	Brexit	vote	–	and	spurred	by	the	UK’s	impending	departure	–	European	defence	plans	have	been
accelerating	quickly.	Some	projects,	after	lying	dormant	for	several	years,	are	finally	coming	to	fruition.	The	European
Union	is	making	strides	towards	greater	structural	integration	of	its	defence	forces	through	the	Permanent	Structured
Cooperation	(PESCO)	programme,	part	of	the	EU’s	new	comprehensive	approach	to	defence	coordination.	PESCO
aims	to	set	up	binding	commitments	between	Member	States	to	jointly	develop	military	capacities	through	an
ambitious	programme	of	collaborative	projects	spanning	training,	logistics,	infrastructure,	and	cyber	security.	PESCO
was	activated	in	September	2017,	with	25	of	the	current	28	EU	Member	States	signing	on.	Of	the	three	non-
participating	Member	States,	Denmark	has	a	permanent	opt-out	from	EU	common	defence	policy,	Malta	is	currently
relying	on	its	constitutional	neutrality	clause,	and	the	UK,	heading	for	the	exit	door,	will	not	be	eligible	to	participate
once	it	loses	its	Member	State	status	at	this	stage.
PESCO	is	still	in	its	early	days,	but	it	has	already	established	17	initial	collaborative	projects	in	the	areas	of	‘training,
capability	development	and	operational	readiness’,	each	with	participating	Member	States	attached	in	various
capacities.	While	this	seems	to	leave	the	UK	on	the	sidelines,	the	EU	is	currently	deciding	on	the	conditions	under
which	‘third	countries’,	including	the	UK,	may	be	able	to	participate	in	individual	projects.	For	now,	EU	guidance	on
the	matter	suggests	that	they	are	open	to	UK	participation	in	PESCO	projects,	but	only	by	invitation	and	subject	to
the	general	conditions	of	third-country	participation,	which	are	yet	to	be	fully	decided.
PESCO	is	just	one	of	the	programmes	recently	initiated	under	a	broader	push	for	common	security	and	defence
integration,	along	with	the	European	Defence	Fund	and	an	annual	defence	review.	Despite	the	general	Brexit
rhetoric	about	not	wanting	to	be	a	rule-taker,	the	UK	would	likely	be	willing	to	agree	to	a	consultative	arrangement	in
this	area	if	it	helped	them	get	a	comprehensive	security	arrangement	with	the	EU.	While	this	would	mean	that	the	UK
would	not	have	a	seat	around	the	table,	it	could	provide	it	with	some	leverage	to	have	a	say	in	any	operations	it
would	be	a	part	of.
The	Anglo-French	alliance
Another	way	that	the	UK	can	maintain	links	with	Europe	is	through	bilateral	relationships.	One	of	the	most	important
of	these	is	the	Anglo-French	alliance.	Now,	with	the	UK	heading	for	the	door,	France	has	seen	an	opportunity	to	take
the	lead	in	European	defence	policy,	while	at	the	same	time	not	abandoning	its	old	ally	across	the	channel.	France	is
Europe’s	only	other	nuclear	power,	has	a	permanent	seat	on	the	UN	Security	Council,	and	(along	with	Britain)	has
one	of	the	largest	defence	industries	in	Europe.	It	is,	therefore,	slated	to	be	the	pre-eminent	engine	of	European
security	post-Brexit.	Emmanuel	Macron’s	recent	trip	to	Washington	also	signals	France’s	role	as	an	important
interlocutor	with	the	United	States.
Macron	has	already	made	overtures	towards	inhabiting	these	new	roles,	having	outlined	his	plans	for	a	‘European
Intervention	Initiative’	(EII),	which	would	establish	a	common	European	intervention	force,	a	common	defence	fund,
and	a	common	security	doctrine.	It	is	not	clear	exactly	how	this	would	sit	alongside	other	European	programmes	like
PESCO,	but,	at	the	military	summit	at	Sandhurst	earlier	this	year,	Macron	made	it	clear	that	the	UK	would	be	an
indispensable	partner.	This	suggests	the	EII	would	sit	outside	of	the	EU	framework,	despite	being	planned	as	a
collaboration	between	Europe’s	major	defence	powers,	and	may	put	it	in	direct	competition	with	the	EU’s	own	plans.
In	the	same	speech,	Macron	underlined	the	importance	of	the	existing	Franco-British	defence	relationship.	In	2010,
the	UK	and	France	signed	the	Lancaster	House	Treaties,	which	committed	them	to	decades	of	nuclear	co-operation,
initiated	joint	operations	between	the	two	armies,	and	set	up	long-term	collaborative	projects	between	their	defence
industries.	Work	continues	on	a	€2bn	Anglo-French	contract	to	develop	an	unmanned	air	combat	system	to	be	ready
for	testing	in	the	early	2020s.	Examples	like	these	raise	the	question	of	what	the	impact	of	Brexit	will	be	on	the	UK
defence	industry.	While	bilateral	programmes	like	those	it	shares	with	France	are	lucrative,	UK	defence	contractors
are	wary	of	losing	access	to	the	full	range	of	contracts	that	will	be	up	for	grabs	under	EDF-funded	projects.	It	is	not
clear	that	bilateral	programmes	will	be	enough	to	sustain	the	UK	defence	industry,	and	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	the
UK	will	be	able	to	negotiate	‘pay	to	play’	access	to	projects	set	up	under	other	of	the	EU’s	new	programmes,
including	PESCO.
Politics	and	geopolitics
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European	defence	has	been	revived	in	recent	years	thanks	not	only	to	Brexit,	but	also	to	two	main	developments	on
the	world	stage:	an	increasingly	unpredictable	ally	in	the	United	States,	and	tensions	with	Russia.	Both	trends	may
also	have	the	effect	of	reinforcing	the	UK’s	defence	relationship	with	the	EU.
When	the	UK	invokes	‘shared	values’	with	its	European	partners,	this	is	partly	a	reference	to	common	adversaries.	In
this	sense,	increased	geopolitical	tensions	may	help	keep	the	security	partnership	between	the	UK	and	the	EU
together	regardless	of	other	Brexit	tensions.	The	expulsion	of	Russian	diplomats	in	late	March	–	by	the	UK	and	16
other	EU	Member	States	–	in	response	to	the	suspected	involvement	of	the	Russian	government	in	the	poisoning
of	the	Skirpals,	was	considered	a	diplomatic	victory	and	showed	an	ongoing	solidarity	between	the	UK	and	its	allies
in	the	EU.	Likewise,	an	increasingly	‘assertive’	Russia	has	provided	impetus	for	a	bolstered	European	common	front.
Meanwhile,	the	US	under	Donald	Trump	has	made	the	transatlantic	partnership	look	somewhat	less	stable.	The
Trump	administration’s	‘America-first’	policy	in	the	area	of	foreign	policy,	as	well	as	its	volatile	posturing	towards
NATO,	may	push	the	UK	closer	to	the	EU	pillar	of	the	alliance.
In	short,	the	EU	and	the	UK	have	many	foreign	policy	and	defence	complementarities	and	there	seems	to	be	more
goodwill	and	less	tension	in	this	area	than	there	has	been	around	issues	like	free	movement	and	the	divorce	bill.
However,	in	the	event	of	a	souring	of	talks	over,	for	example,	a	future	trade	arrangement	or	citizens’	rights,	there	is
potential	for	collateral	damage	in	future	security	arrangements.	Perhaps	the	most	potentially	fraught	question
remains	the	Irish	border,	about	which	talks	remain	at	an	impasse.	In	short,	any	conflicts	arising	in	the	economic	and
political	deal	have	the	potential	to	scupper	at	least	the	more	ambitious	plans	for	a	comprehensive	security
arrangement	that	the	UK	–	and	indeed	the	EU	–	is	currently	seeking.
This	post	represents	a	report	on	a	discussion	and	not	the	views	of	the	author,	the	Brexit	blog	or	the	LSE.	For	a
longer,	fully-referenced	version,	please	see	the	full	write-up.
Sean	M	Deel	is	a	PhD	candidate	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.	His	research	deals	with	the	political	sociology	of
free	movement	of	EU	citizens.
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